USA v. Kenneth Schneider by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-23-2021 
USA v. Kenneth Schneider 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Kenneth Schneider" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 373. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/373 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2021 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 














On Appeal from the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:10-cr-00029-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sánchez 
_____________ 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 11, 2021 
_____________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 








 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
  
Kenneth Schneider was sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment after he was 
convicted of one count of traveling for the purpose of engaging in sex with a minor, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).  He now challenges the District Court’s denial of his 
petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court for the reasons we explain below. 
I. 
We write only for the parties, so our summary of the facts is brief.  In January 
2010, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted Schneider on one 
count of traveling for the purpose of engaging in sex with a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), 
and one count of transporting a person for criminal sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 2421.  
The charges against Schneider rested on allegations that he had committed an 
egregious pattern of sexual abuse against a Russian boy, who we will refer to as “RZ,” 
for several years from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s.  See United States v. Schneider, 
801 F.3d 186, 189-91 (3d Cir. 2015).  Schneider and the Government agree on many of 
the facts about his relationship with RZ:  Schneider, an American, had practiced law in 
Moscow and supported ballet artists for several years when, in 1998, he was introduced 
to the 12-year-old boy.  RZ’s family could no longer afford room and board for his ballet 
lessons at the Bolshoi Academy, so Schneider offered to sponsor RZ and obtained RZ’s 
parents’ permission to have the boy live with him in Moscow during the week. 
RZ then lived with Schneider and Schneider’s family for several years.  During 
this time, Schneider brought RZ with him from Russia to the United States to attend a 
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summer ballet program in greater Philadelphia, from which Schneider and RZ returned to 
Russia on August 22, 2001.  Although the Government anchored its charges in the 
August 22, 2001 trip, Schneider and RZ made a longer-term return to the United States 
beginning in 2002, where RZ finished high school, started college, and danced 
professionally.  While attending college, RZ met Gina D’Amico, who he eventually 
married in 2007.  RZ first made his allegations of sexual abuse against Schneider public 
in 2008 when he filed a civil lawsuit claiming that Schneider had sexually abused him for 
years.1 
Those allegations laid the groundwork for the Government’s criminal prosecution 
of Schneider.  Because Schneider acknowledged that he had supported RZ but denied any 
allegations of sexual wrongdoing, the central dispute in Schneider’s criminal trial was a 
credibility contest over whether his relationship with RZ had in fact been sexual.  
To this end, the Government most significantly put forward evidence that by 
August 2000, Schneider was having oral and anal sex with RZ several times per week.  
The Government also elicited testimony tending to show that Schneider had groomed RZ 
and manipulated him to keep silent about Schneider’s abuse.  The Government’s 
evidence showed that Schneider had taken an “audition” video of RZ practicing ballet in 
his underwear and that Schneider never caused the tape to be viewed at any ballet 
schools, and that Schneider had told RZ to use an unusually informal Russian term of 
address for him.  RZ also testified that Schneider had shown him a Russian film 
 
1 RZ’s civil lawsuit resulted in a settlement in December 2014. 
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glorifying the relationship between a young ballet dancer and his mentor, compared his 
and Schneider’s relationship to the one in the film, and advised RZ not to make the 
mistake of leaving him for a woman.  The Government presented further evidence that 
tended to show Schneider’s manipulative tactics, including that Schneider threatened RZ 
that if he discussed the abuse RZ would be unable to travel to the United States, that 
Schneider told RZ to lie to his school nurse about anal injuries, and that Schneider tried 
to end RZ’s relationship with the woman he would eventually marry. 
With Schneider denying any allegations of sexual abuse, he instead tried to cast 
RZ as a liar motivated by greed and the prospect of a large civil recovery.  Schneider 
therefore focused his trial strategy on undermining the credibility of the Government’s 
witnesses.  His attorneys presented an extensive defense with testimony from Schneider, 
his family members, RZ’s civil lawyer and therapist, and various fact witnesses about the 
relationship between Schneider and RZ in Russia.  Schneider now claims that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel as to three elements of that defense. 
First, Schneider’s lawyer made several references to an article in Kommersant, 
Russia’s main business newspaper, which described Schneider as a homosexual and a 
pedophile.  These references occurred during Schneider’s opening statement, while 
examining RZ’s parents and Bolshoi instructors, and when Schneider took the stand in 
his own defense.  Schneider’s lawyer repeatedly either told the jury or elicited from 
witnesses that the piece had been retracted several days after the newspaper had 
published it. 
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Second, Schneider’s counsel called RZ’s therapist and lawyer as witnesses.  On 
direct examination, Schneider’s attorney worked to elicit from the therapist testimony 
about how little information RZ had provided her about any history of sexual abuse.  
During the Government’s cross-examination, however, she testified that victims of sexual 
abuse sometimes have difficulty disclosing their past trauma.  Similarly, while RZ’s 
lawyer provided some helpful testimony for Schneider — including that he had 
intervened in RZ’s psychological treatment — he also testified that he thought RZ’s 
claims were meritorious enough to pursue a civil action and offered his own negative 
opinions about Schneider’s conduct and legal exposure. 
Third, while the parties’ closing arguments were otherwise unremarkable, 
Schneider’s counsel at one point offered a comment characterizing the charges against 
Schneider as “made up, is maybe, too strong.”  Appendix (“App.”) 13.  This remark came 
after Schneider’s attorney discussed the Government’s second charge of transporting a 
person for the purpose of criminal sexual conduct. 
The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts.  The District Court acquitted 
Schneider on the § 2421 charge after a post-trial motion and sentenced Schneider to 180 
months of imprisonment.  Schneider directly appealed and we affirmed the conviction in 
2015.  See Schneider, 801 F.3d at 205.  After the Supreme Court denied certiorari over 
Schneider’s direct appeal, see Schneider v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1217 (2016), 
Schneider filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that his trial counsel was 
ineffective on, inter alia, the grounds discussed above. 
6 
The District Court denied Schneider’s petition.  See United States v. Schneider, 
Civ. No. 17-935, 2019 WL 4242637 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2019).  It found that Schneider’s 
counsel introduced the Kommersant article as part of a reasonable trial strategy, and that 
his counsel’s discussion of the article’s retraction cured any potential prejudice.  The 
District Court further concluded that Schneider’s counsel had been similarly strategic in 
calling RZ’s therapist and lawyer, and that the “made up, is maybe, too strong” closing 
argument remark may have been strategic and in any event had not caused Schneider 
prejudice.    
Schneider timely sought leave to appeal, and we granted a certificate of 
appealability on the three ineffective assistance claims set forth above. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Schneider’s prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and over Schneider’s collateral petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253.  When reviewing the denial of a § 
2255 petition, we examine “legal determinations de novo, factual findings for clear error, 
and matters committed to the District Court’s discretion for the abuse thereof.”  United 
States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 2015).  Among those matters committed to the 
District Court’s discretion is whether to grant an evidentiary hearing.  United States v. 
Scripps, 961 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 2020).  
III. 
We evaluate Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the 
framework provided by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Under 
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Strickland, Schneider must show that (1) any errors by his lawyers were so serious that 
his counsel did not perform the function guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) his 
lawyers’ deficient performance prejudiced him.  Id. at 687. 
To meet the first prong of the Strickland test, Schneider must show that his 
lawyers’ performance was so deficient that it “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.”  Scripps, 961 F.3d at 632 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  In 
assessing this performance, we “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689.  Schneider bears the burden of rebutting this presumption “by showing 
either that the conduct was not, in fact, part of a strategy or by showing that the strategy 
employed was unsound.”  Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491, 499-500 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(footnote omitted).  To the extent the record “does not explicitly disclose trial counsel’s 
actual strategy or lack thereof,” he may only do so “through a showing that no sound 
strategy posited by the [Government] could have supported [his counsel’s] conduct.”  Id. 
at 500.    When assessing Strickland’s second prong of prejudice, a court must determine 
whether there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different,” which is “a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
Schneider asserts that the introduction of the Kommersant article, his attorney’s 
decision to call RZ’s therapist and lawyer, and his counsel’s remark during closing 
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argument were each incidents of inadequate assistance that prejudiced him at trial.  We 
disagree and address each claimed error in turn. 
A. 
Schneider first argues that his lawyer was defective when he introduced the 
Kommersant article calling Schneider a homosexual and pedophile.  Although we agree 
that the content of the article could be inflammatory, cf. United States v. Cunningham, 
694 F.3d 372, 390-91 (3d Cir. 2012) (vacating defendant’s conviction where 
inflammatory child pornography evidence created prejudice substantially outweighing its 
probative value), especially without further context, our inquiry does not end there.  
Rather, the record supports the District Court’s conclusion that each time Schneider’s 
attorney discussed the article, he did so in a way that could readily be understood as part 
of a deliberate strategy.  Schneider’s counsel first mentioned the article during his 
opening statement, where he explained that it was an example of underhanded Russian 
business and political tactics, that if the article were true Schneider would have been 
prosecuted in Russia, and that the article’s retraction and RZ’s parents’ contemporaneous 
trust in Schneider instead showed Schneider’s innocence.   
This theme explains further references to the article.  We see no error in the 
District Court’s understanding of the record to show that Schneider’s counsel introduced 
the article to demonstrate that “no one … actually believed Schneider was a pedophile at 
the time the article came out,” and that “Schneider was being unfairly targeted.”  App. 
11.  When cross-examining RZ’s father, for instance, Schneider’s counsel attempted to 
have him acknowledge that he was aware of the article’s content and its retraction when 
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he concluded it would be safe to entrust Schneider with RZ’s care in America.  Similarly, 
Schneider’s lawyer’s questions to RZ’s mother about the article and its retraction were 
consistent with an attempt to show that she trusted Schneider with RZ’s care, rather than 
being “untethered to any point or theory” as Schneider asserts.  Schneider Br. 25.  The 
same goes for the testimony that Schneider’s counsel elicited from Bolshoi instructors 
Tatiana Dokukina and Nikolai Dokukin.  Schneider’s lawyer explained at trial that he had 
elicited Dokukina’s testimony about the article to explain her mental state, and to show 
that she knew the accusation to be false.  Similarly, the line of questions directed at 
Dokukin was designed to elicit testimony about a strained political relationship between 
Schneider and senior Bolshoi management.  Finally, when Schneider testified about the 
article on direct examination, he similarly did so in a way designed to show political bias 
on the part of Bolshoi management, which was also consistent with an attempt to elicit 
favor and sympathy from the jury. 
Nor are we persuaded by Schneider’s attempt to cast the Kommersant article’s 
introduction as a failure on the part of his counsel to investigate potential exculpatory 
witnesses.  See Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 682 (3d Cir. 2006).  Schneider did not 
need to call more witnesses simply to show that the article had been retracted, or to 
testify generally about the Russian practice of kompromat.2  Rather, Schneider’s counsel 
strategically introduced the article to show its effect — or more specifically, the lack 
 
2 “[C]ompromising information collected for use in blackmailing, discrediting, or 
manipulating a person…esp. for political purposes.” Kompromat, OXFORD ENG. 
DICTIONARY (Dec. 2020), https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/89270850. 
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thereof — on its readers.  Just because this strategy did not result in an acquittal does not 
mean it was an unviable one, and we will not “second-guess” with “post hoc 
determinations that a different trial strategy would have fared better.”  Id. at 681-82.  
Because Schneider has not shown that “no sound strategy” could have supported his 
counsel’s actions in raising the Kommersant article, see Thomas, 428 F.3d at 499-500, 
Schneider fails to satisfy Strickland’s first prong here. 
B. 
Schneider next argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his 
attorney called RZ’s therapist, Christina Bates, and RZ’s lawyer in his civil case against 
Schneider, E. William Hevenor.  We are unpersuaded that the District Court erred when 
it denied relief as to both these claims of ineffective assistance. 
First, Schneider claims that the testimony his lawyer elicited from Bates revealed 
“classic indicators of prior trauma” which corroborated the Government’s theory of the 
case and reflected his counsel’s “lack of preparation and thorough record review.”  
Schneider Br. 41, 43.  But the District Court was correct to conclude that the trial record 
reveals that “counsel’s decision to call her in the original instance was reasonable.”  App. 
16.  Schneider’s counsel repeatedly inquired about how little RZ had revealed about any 
trauma he might have experienced, with the goal of showing to the jury that RZ’s failure 
to discuss past trauma tended to show its nonexistence. 
Nor does Schneider’s counsel’s strategy reflect a lack of preparation or 
insufficient review of the record.  Schneider complains that his attorney incompetently 
opened the door for the Government to use its cross-examination to reframe RZ’s silence 
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as consistent with a history of sexual abuse.  But it is not incompetence simply for an 
attorney to introduce helpful evidence that an opposing party tries to recharacterize or 
discredit on cross-examination, see, e.g., Drake v. Clark, 14 F.3d 351, 356 (7th Cir. 
1994), especially where, as here, Bates’s notes helped Schneider because they indicated 
she had difficulty characterizing RZ’s symptoms as a result of molestation.   
We are similarly unpersuaded to the extent that Schneider now attempts to cast the 
decision to call Bates as a failure to review her treatment records adequately.  Schneider’s 
attorney was attentive to Bates’s notes at trial, and reasonably chose to call Bates as a 
witness rather than RZ’s other therapist, who RZ selected with the aid of his civil lawyer 
and who may well have been a worse witness for Schneider.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that Schneider’s lawyer acted reasonably when he chose to call Bates, and are 
furthermore unpersuaded that the Government’s attempts to neutralize the effect of 
Bates’s testimony prejudiced Schneider within the meaning of Strickland or even made 
him any worse off than if Bates had never been called. 
Second, Schneider argues that his lawyer erred in calling Hevenor.  Schneider 
claims that his counsel incompetently elicited testimony from Hevenor laying out 
Hevenor’s theory of the case in the civil suit against Schneider, and failed to lead 
Hevenor as a hostile witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 611(c)(2).  
But here, too, we agree with the District Court that calling Hevenor was neither 
unreasonable nor prejudicial to Schneider.  To begin with, when Hevenor offered 
improper remarks on RZ’s civil case outside the scope of Schneider’s questions, 
Schneider’s attorney worked diligently to ensure the District Court reined in Hevenor’s 
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testimony.  We further agree with the District Court that it was reasonable to probe the 
factual basis on which Hevenor asserted civil claims against Schneider’s parents who the 
Government neither prosecuted nor called as witnesses — and that in a credibility contest 
between Schneider and RZ, it was reasonable for Schneider’s attorney to show the 
substantial financial reward motivating RZ.  It may also have been strategic to present 
that number through testimony from a reticent Hevenor rather than only through other 
sources.  Moreover, Hevenor testified to his role in intervening in RZ’s therapeutic 
treatment and helping to select RZ’s new therapist once Bates noted that RZ suffered no 
impairment in functioning.  Schneider’s counsel could have reasonably elicited this 
evidence to show that RZ had tried to “cherry pick” a clinical validation for his 
allegations in order to cast doubt on any attempt to corroborate RZ’s claims. 
Finally, even if Schneider’s counsel was deficient in calling Hevenor, we remain 
in agreement with the District Court that there was no reasonable probability that his 
testimony would affect the outcome of Schneider’s trial.  In addition to the lengthy case 
the Government presented, the jury was fully aware of the nature of Hevenor’s 
relationship with RZ.  With Hevenor’s bias established, the impact of any improper or 
inflammatory remarks was in all probability muted in the jury’s eyes, and therefore did 
not prejudice Schneider. 
C. 
Schneider furthermore takes issue with his attorney’s closing remark 
characterizing the charges against Schneider as “made up, is maybe, too strong.”  
Schneider Br. 52.  Schneider argues that because his attorney’s comment qualified the 
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notion that the charges were “made up,” it operated as an unauthorized concession of 
guilt in the context of a defense that sought principally to undermine RZ’s credibility.   
We disagree.  Schneider’s attorney made clear throughout the trial and his closing 
argument that Schneider maintained his innocence.  Schneider’s counsel made the “made 
up” remark while discussing how the Government needed to prove that Schneider had 
traveled with RZ for the purpose of engaging in illegal sexual activity.  We agree with the 
District Court that in that context, the remark could have served numerous strategic 
purposes.  These could be to ingratiate Schneider’s counsel with the jury; to acknowledge 
the undisputed fact that Schneider and RZ had traveled together; or to suggest that 
because both Schneider and RZ lived in Russia, the Government could in no case prove 
that Schneider’s primary purpose in returning there was to sexually abuse RZ.  Certainly, 
Schneider’s attorney’s remark does not rise to the level of a total concession of guilt 
before the jury like an attorney might make in a two-phase capital case.  See McCoy v. 
Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508-09 (2018); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 188-89 
(2004).   
In any case, we agree with the District Court that this single remark did not 
prejudice Schneider and carried no reasonable probability of affecting the trial’s outcome 
in light of Schneider’s repeated invocations of innocence in the face of substantial 
testimony against him.  Because we are unpersuaded that Schneider has satisfied both 
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prongs of Strickland here, we will not disturb the District Court’s denial of relief on this 
claim of ineffective assistance.  
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Schneider’s 
§ 2255 petition. 
